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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
A. Plaintiffs filed this action in the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah, on the basis of Diversity of Citizenship 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332, Mr. McArthur being a resident of 
Utah and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
(State Farm) not. Mr. McArthur suffered personal injuries and 
medical and hospital expenses such that this case has an 
amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.00 exclusive of 
interest and costs and exceeding the sum specified by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a). 
B. The trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to State 
Farm and deny Mr. McArthur's motion for summary judgment 
resulted in a final judgment in favor of State Farm. Under 28 
U.S.C.A. §1291 and F.R.A.P 3 and 4 this judgment was 
appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals which accepted 
jurisdiction. 
C. The trial court's memorandum and decision was entered on 
December 9, 2009. Mr. McArthur filed his notice of appeal on 
7 
December 29, 2009 within the time limits set by F.R.A.P. 
4(a)(1)(A). 
D. This is an appeal from a final judgment that disposes of all 
parties' claims. 
E. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on October 21, 2010 
ordered state law questions, determinative of the outcome, to be 
certified to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
F. The Supreme Court of Utah accepted the certification by order 
filed December 9, 2010. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Whether the Utah Supreme Court should adopt the majority 
view in holding that an exhaustion clause in an insurance policy 
providing coverage for Underinsured Motorist Claims (UIM) is 
unenforceable, thus preventing insureds like Tavis McArthur 
from being hung on the horns of this dilemma: if Mr. 
McArthur accepted the final settlement offered by the liability 
carrier with a 10% discount from policy limits as the price of 
settlement, then he would waive his UIM coverage of $100,000 
but, if he sued to collect 100% of the liability coverage, as State 
8 
Farm (the UIM carrier) insisted, he would be required to spend 
years of time and attorney's fees to collect a mere $10,000 
which, in his injury-induced impoverishment, he could not 
afford to do. 
B. If the exhaustion clause of the UIM policy is not generally 
unenforceable, whether the enforceability of such exhaustion 
clause is contingent upon the insurer establishing actual 
prejudice to its economic interest. 
C. These are the issues presented as likely dispositive in the 
proceedings before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, no Utah 
law appearing to control the answers to the certified questions, 
restated here as issues. 
CITATION TO RECORD SHOWING PRESERVATION OF RECORD 
ON APPEAL 
A. No such citation is necessary inasmuch as the Tenth Circuit 
has certified these questions as determinative of disposition in 
that court, which certification presumes that the Tenth Circuit 
has already concluded that the issues are preserved on appeal. 
9 
V. STATUTE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Utah Code Annotated (UCA) section 31 A-22-305.3, subsection (5) 
provides: 
5)(a) Within five business days after notification in a manner 
specified by the department that all liability insurers have tendered their 
liability policy limits, the underinsured carrier shall either: 
(i) waive any subrogation claim the underinsured carrier may 
have against the person liable for the injuries caused in the accident; or 
(ii) pay the insured an amount equal to the policy limits tendered 
by the liability carrier. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
Tavis McArthur sued State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company (State Farm) alleging that it had violated its insurance contract by 
refusing to consider Mr. McArthur's claim for UIM benefits from which he 
desired to satisfy the balance of his $200,000 in personal injury damages. 
State Farm alleged that it had no obligation to consider the claim for 
$1005000 in UIM benefits because Mr. McArthur had only recovered 
10 
$90,000 of the $1005000 policy limits of the negligent motorist while the 
UIM policy requires exhaustion of liability policy limits as a condition to 
recovery of UIM benefits. The trial court ruled on cross motions for 
summary judgment that the exhaustion clause was enforceable as written and 
did not violate Utah public policy, granting State Farm's summary judgment 
and denying Plaintiffs. 
B. Statement Of The Facts 
Mr. Mc Arthur's complaint alleged the following facts: On August 5, 
2007, Mr. McArthur was driving his motorcycle on River Road in St. 
George, Utah. As a result of a car crash, Mr. McArthur was thrown from his 
motorcycle. Mr. McArthur underwent open reduction and internal fixation of 
the 4th and 5th tarsometatarsal joints and open reduction and internal fixation 
of the 4th and 5 metatarsophalangeal joints in the left foot. Mr. McArthur's 
recovery was delayed by several complications, causing him to seek 
treatment for pain management. He continues to suffer pain relentlessly, a 
condition known as reflex dystrophy syndrome, sometimes called complex 
regional pain syndrome. He received a whole body disability rating of 19%. 
Mr. McArthur's contended below that his damages exceeded $200,000. 
However, Mr. McArthur alleged that he felt compelled to accept the $90,000 
11 
final settlement offer from the liability carrier's $100,000 policy limits 
because he, not having worked since the accident, could not survive without 
immediate funds. His only alternative was to file a lawsuit against the 
negligent motorist. However, the cost in time and money for such a suit 
would have been much greater than the additional $10,000 insurance he was 
entitled to recover for his injuries against the liability carrier of the negligent 
motorist. 
Mr. McArthur then asserted a claim to collect the $100,000 UIM limits 
from his own motorist insurance policy. But State Farm refused to consider 
the claim, invoking the exhaustion clause in the UIM policy, which makes 
recovery of UIM benefits conditional upon exhausting all policy limits of all 
possible liability policies. This, the pertinent language of the exhaustion 
clause at issue, is not at issue: 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNTIL: 1. THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF 
ALL BODILY INJURY LIABILITY BONDS AND POLICIES THAT 
APPLY HAVE BEEN USED UP BY PAYMENT OR JUDGMENTS OR 
SETTLEMENTS TO OTHER PERSONS . . . . 
Cross motions for summary judgment were filed. The trial court 
decided that the facts that Plaintiff had alleged as context for deciding to 
12 
accept the $90,000 settlement were irrelevant to his decision, ruling that 
regardless of those facts, one fact was determinative: that Mr. McArthur's 
acceptance of the final $90,000 settlement offer from the liability carrier 
precluded him from making a claim for the difference between the liability 
policy limits of $100,000 and the UIM limits of $100,000.l 
VII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
State Farm denied Mr. McArthur, already suffering intolerable burdens 
because of his injuries and disability, his $100,000 in UIM benefits. State 
Farm invoked a harsh and penal exhaustion clause, a provision of Mr. 
McArthur's insurance policy which has no economic justification for State 
Farm, except for the advantage gained by denying otherwise earned benefits. 
The many jurisdictions that have rejected the exhaustion clause have held 
that the UIM carrier is given credit for the full policy limits, thus satisfying 
every legitimate financial interest of the UIM carrier. The UIM carrier never 
loses any money if there is a credit granted because the UIM carrier only 
pays out the difference between the liability policy limits and the UIM 
obligation. 
The facts stated herein were supported by the record and not disputed in 
the Tenth Circuit. 
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Of courts deciding the issue, 23 of 30 hold the UIM exhaustion clause 
void as against public policy. Neighboring states considering the issue 
(Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, and Hawaii) 
have expressly ruled in accordance the majority opinion, rejecting the 
exhaustion clause. Nearly every court that has not so held bases its decision 
on statutory language that requires exhaustion, the prominent examples 
being California and Alaska. 
Utah's UIM statutes do not require exhaustion of policy limits as do 
California's and Alaska's. The Utah UIM statutes expressly define a UIM 
situation without reference to policy limits. However, Utah's UIM statutes 
make a single reference to "policy limits" but only within the context of 
subrogation rights, rights that are practically impossible for a UIM carrier to 
exercise effectively. This subrogation right is intended to benefit the UIM 
claimant by preventing the UIM carrier from denying claims on the grounds 
that the injured person's release precluded the UIM carrier's right of 
subrogation. 
Most jurisdictions have statutory references to "policy limits," yet they 
still hold that public policy invalidates the exhaustion clause. 
14 
Utah public policy, expressed in references both to the beneficial 
nature of UIM coverage and to settlement of litigation, demands vitiation of 
the exhaustion clause. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48, 89 P.3d 97 
(Sup. Ct. 2003) indicates that Utah should adopt the majority rule because it 
follows the majority rule on the issue of the consent-to-settle clause which 
was an early battle ground fought by the insurance industry to attempt to 
avoid UIM claims. The majority rule ameliorated the harsh effects of the 
consent-to-settle clause by holding that the insured could proceed with the 
UIM claim even without obtaining consent unless the insurance company 
could prove that it could have collected a subrogation judgment against the 
personal assets of the tortfeasor. This majority that Green followed 
regarding consent-to-settle uses similar reasoning as that of the majority that 
strikes down the exhaustion clause as a technicality. Montana, in Sorensen v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch. 279 Mont. 291, 927 P.2d 1002 (Mont. 1996), first 
decided in favor of the insured on a consent-to-settle case and the next year 
then went on to decide in favor of the insured in an exhaustion clause case, 
using the reasoning from the consent-to-settle case to support its reasoning 
for the exhaustion clause case. Augustine v. Simonson, 283 Mont. 259, 940 
15 
P.2d 116 (1997). Since Utah uses the same reasoning in its consent-to-settle 
case, it should follow the same path that Montana took in striking down the 
exhaustion clause. 
Mr. McArthur will show that Utah's UIM statutes are similar to the 
statutes of the states that have adopted the majority rule. In fact, Utah's 
statutes are more favorable to striking down the exhaustion clause than the 
typical statutory scheme of the majority rule. Most of the Western states that 
have adopted the majority rule do so in the face of statutes that define UIM 
coverage in terms of "limits of liability." The cases cited by State Farm are 
not persuasive regarding the Utah statutory scheme. 
VIIL ARGUMENT 
A. THE EXHAUSTION CLAUSE IS A HARSH, TECHNICAL PENALTY 
THAT VIOLATES THE INTERESTS OF THE INSURED. 
As in the instant case, the UIM insurance contract typically includes a 
provision that all applicable liability insurance policies must be exhausted 
before the UIM carrier is obligated to consider a UIM claim. Nearly all the 
courts who have considered the validity of the exhaustion clause, absent 
statutory language compelling exhaustion, have condemned the exhaustion 
clause as technical, penal and contrary to the beneficial policies that UIM 
statutes seek to promote. For example, in Mann v. Farmers Insurance 
16 
Exchange, 108 Nev. 648, 836 P.2d 620 (1992) the Supreme Court of Nevada, 
invalidating the exhaustion clause, observed: 
The damaged insured is placed in a difficult situation if he or she must 
forego all settlement offers and go to trial in order to obtain (or attempt 
to obtain) compensation up to the tortfeasor's policy limit — just to 
qualify for underinsured benefits under his or her own policy. For 
instance, if an insured covered by a policy like Mann's were involved 
in an accident with three other drivers, each of whom was responsible 
for the accident to a different extent, the insured would have to exhaust 
the liability limits of each tortfeasor's policy before pursuing 
underinsured motorist benefits. Thus, in this example, even if one of 
the drivers was only ten percent at fault, the insured could not settle 
with this driver for less than his or her policy limit without giving up 
underinsured motorist benefits. 
Additionally, if a tortfeasor offers the insured, in good faith, an amount 
less than the tortfeasor's policy limit, and the insured has suffered 
injuries exceeding the tortfeasor's policy limit, the insured cannot 
accept this offer, even if it is close to the tortfeasor's policy limit, 
unless the insured is willing to forego underinsured motorist benefits. 
Instead, the insured is forced to go to trial, and costs are added while 
payment is delayed. 
While the Nevada Supreme Court was not faced with the actual 
situation of multiple negligent parties it used that hypothetical to underscore 
the injustice of the technical application of the exhaustion clause. To cut 
down on its payout, every liability carrier wishes to impute even a small 
degree of fault to a third party, perhaps only tenuously related to the accident. 
If that party has even moderately sized insurance limits, exhaustion will be 
2
 Mann, supra, involved one negligent party. P. 620 
17 
impossible, giving pretext for avoidance of the UIM claim. The exhaustion 
clause State Farm included in Mr. McArthur's policy, if enforced according 
to its terms, would likewise require the exhaustion of the liability policy of a 
comparatively negligent party whose negligence contributed only a small 
portion of the total fault causative of the accident. For example, a negligent 
party's policy may have limits of $300,000 but his or her percentage of the 
total fault is only 10%, thus making impossible the exhaustion of policy 
limits. This technical application would certainly result in an unjust denial of 
UIM benefits. 
The Montana Supreme Court in Augustine v. Simonson, 940 P. 2d 116, 
119 (Mont Sup. Ct. 1997) voided the exhaustion clause as a "technicality," 
reasoning from a prior decision in this language: 
[W]e held that there was no prejudice to the insurer where the tort-
feasor was judgment proof and, consequently, the insured's actions 
would not compromise the insurer's ability to subrogate. We explained 
the meaning of this no prejudice rule as "absent some showing of 
material prejudice to the underinsurance carrier, a claim for 
underinsured motorist coverage may not be precluded on a 
technicality." Sorenszn, 927 P.2d at 1004 (Emphasis added.) 
18 
The Montana Supreme Court, quoting language from the Ohio Supreme 
Court , further reasoned: 
Where the amount of settlement is less than the policy limits, the 
unpaid amount may well represent the savings in litigation costs for 
both sides. More importantly, settlement hastens the payment to the 
injured party who obviously needs compensation soon after the 
injuries when the medical expenses begin to amass and when the 
anxiety level is probably quite high. 
Id. at 119, 120 
This applies directly to the instant case. Mr. McArthur contended 
below that he accepted a $10,000 discount from $100,000 in liability policy 
limits because he could not afford to litigate over that small amount. His 
medical bills and lost wages "amassing," his physical and financial health in 
shambles, his anxiety rising, Mr. McArthur simply could not be reasonably 
required to litigate for two or three years, spending over a $100,000 in fees 
and costs, to recover a mere $10,000. 
Utah public policy, as shown below, is offended by this kind of litigation 
gamesmanship. Moreover, Utah decisional law has held that UIM benefits 
are not to be denied by "a merely technical" application of UIM policy 
language intended to preserve subrogation rights. See State Farm Mut. Auto. 
3Bogan v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (Ohio 1988), 36 Ohio St. 3d 22, 521 
N.E.2d 447, 451, modified in part on other grounds, McDonald v. Republic-
Franklin Ins. Co. (Ohio 1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 27, 543 N.E.2d 456. 
19 
Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48, 89 P.3d 97, 104 (Sup. Ct. 2003) discussed in 
argument section "D" below at page 22. 
B. THE MAJORITY OF U.S. JURISDICTIONS REJECT THE 
EXHA USTION CLA USE. 
The majority of judicial decisions hold the exhaustion clause void4. 
This majority includes decisions from the states neighboring Utah—Arizona, 
Nevada, Colorado, Montana, Oregon, and Washington5. 
4Cobb v. Benjamin, 325 S.C. 573, 588-589 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); Horace 
Mann Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 215 W. Va. 297, 306 (W. Va. 2004); Omni Ins. Co. 
v. Foreman, 802 So. 2d 195 (Ala. 2001); Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fonk, 198 
Ariz. 167, 7 P.3d 973 (2000); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bencomo, 
873 P.2d 47, (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Knight, 506 
So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1987); Taylor v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 90 Hawaii 
302, 978 P.2d 740 (1999); In re Rucker, 442 N.W.2d 113 (Iowa 1989); 
Brown v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 17 Kan. App. 2d 547 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1992); Metcalfv. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 944 S.W.2d 151, 44 6 Ky. 
L. Summary 6 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Faris, 27 Mass. 
App. Ct. 194, 536 N.E.2d 1097 (1989); Linebaugh v. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. 
Co., 224 Mich. App. 494, 569 N.W.2d 648 (1997); Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 
N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983), superseded by statute as stated in Onasch v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Augustine v. 
Simonson, 283 Mont. 259, 940 P.2d 116 (1997); Mann, v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, Supreme Court of Nevada, 108 Nev. 648; 836 P.2d 620 (1992); 
Barrett v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 295 N.J. Super. 613, 685 A.2d 975 
(1996); Bogan v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 36 Ohio St. 3d 22, 521 N.E.2d 
447 (1988), overruled on other grounds by Ferrando v. Auto-Owners Mut. 
Ins. Co., 98 Ohio St. 3d 186, 2002 Ohio 7217, 781 N.E.2d 927 (2002), 
review denied, 98 Ohio St. 3d 1463, 783 N.E.2d 521 (2003) (unpublished 
table decision); Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co. Inc., 1991 OK 127, 824 P.2d 
1105 (Okla. 1991); Vega v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon, 323 Or. 291, 918 
P.2d 95 (1996), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Hamm v. 
20 
Even the cases cited by Defendant, which rely on statutory language 
constraining exhaustion, admit that the majority view holds the exhaustion 
clause void as against public policy. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Hurley, 76 
Cal. App. 4th 797, 802-803 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1999); Curran v. 
Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co., 29 P.3d 829, 834 (Alaska 2001). 
C. UTAH'S UIM STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE 
EXHAUSTION 
In cross motions for summary judgment, State Farm relied heavily on 
these cases from California and Alaska that ruled in favor of exhaustion. 
However, these cases both relied on statutory language that expressly 
required exhaustion. California's statutory language is quoted in Hurley, 
supra, at p. 800-801: 
The provision at issue in this case, section 11580.2(p)(3), provides that 
underinsurance coverage "does not apply to any bodily injury until the 
limits of bodily injury liability policies applicable to all insured motor 
Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 612 N.W.2d 775 (Iowa 2000); Sorter v. American 
Motorists Ins. Co., 451 Pa. Super. 507, 680 A.2d 881 (1996); LeFranc v. 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 594 A.2d 382 (R.I. 1991), superseded by statute as 
stated in Sunderland v. Allstate Ins. Co., Ill A.2d 53 (R.I. 1998); Cobb v. 
Benjamin, 325 S.C. 573, 482 S.E.2d 589 (Ct. App. 1997); Leal v. 
Northwestern Natl County Mut. Ins. Co., 846 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1993); Hamilton v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 107 Wn. 2d 721, 733 
P.2d 213 (1987). 
Idaho, Wyoming and New Mexico do not have decisions on the 
exhaustion clause according to Plaintiffs research. 
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vehicles causing the injury have been exhausted by payment of judgments 
or settlements, and proof of the payment is submitted to the insurer 
providing the underinsured motorist coverage." 
Alaska's statutory language is quoted in Curran v. Progressive 
Northwestern Ins. Co., 29 P.3d 829, 832 (Alaska 2001): 
Under AS 28.20.445, UIM coverage "may not apply to bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death of an insured or damage to or destruction of 
property of an insured until the limits of liability of all bodily injury and 
property damage liability bonds and policies that apply have been used up 
by payments Judgments or settlements." (Emphasis in original.) 
Utah has no such language in its UIM statutes. Nowhere does Utah's 
code state that UIM coverage may only be obtained if the policy limits of the 
tortfeasor are "exhausted" as did California's legislative code or "used up" as 
did Alaska's. Nowhere does the Utah Code even define UIM coverage in 
terms of that which exceeds the policy limits of the tortfeasor. 
D. UTAH'S SINGLE STATUTORY REFERENCE TO POLICY 
LIMITS APPLIES ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
SUBROGATION RIGHTS OF THE UIM CARRIER WHICH 
ARE OF NEGLIGIBLE PRACTICAL VALUE 
Although Utah's statute does not require exhaustion, it does make a 
reference to policy limits, but only in connection with the statutory scheme to 
preserve the subrogation rights of the UIM carrier in the unlikely event that 
subrogation is of any value. Utah Code Annotated (UCA) section 31A-22-
305.3, subsection (5) provides: 
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5) (a) Within five business days after notification in a manner specified 
by the department that all liability insurers have tendered their liability 
policy limits, the underinsured carrier shall either: 
(i) waive any subrogation claim the underinsured carrier may 
have against the person liable for the injuries caused in the accident; or 
(ii) pay the insured an amount equal to the policy limits tendered 
by the liability carrier. 
To explain the significance of this reference to policy limits in the 
subrogation section of the UIM statutes a little history is necessary. 
Originally, UIM statutes6 made no allowance for the right of subrogation 
against the at-fault party insured by the liability carrier. This right of 
subrogation by traditional principles of insurance law would seem to vest in 
the UIM insurance carrier upon paying out a UIM claim. Schmidt (pp. 261-
263^ ) and Longworth (pp. 183-185,), supra, describe the problem that arose 
when the UIM carrier refused to honor a UIM claim if the claimant had in 
settlement granted a release to the tortfreasor. Because such a release 
eliminated the subrogation right, the UIM carrier felt justified in refusing to 
pay out a UIM claim. Yet the liability carrier would not settle without 
receiving a release of its at-fault insured. In order to solve this dilemma, 
Minnesota and New Jersey, in decisions that invalidated the exhaustion 
6
 For example, those of Minnesota discussed in Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 
N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983), superseded by statute as stated in Onasch v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), and New Jersey, 
Longworth v. Van Houten 223 N.J. Super. 174, 538 A.2d 414 (1988) 
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clause, devised judicially a very similar solution to that which Utah devised 
statutorily. Courts of these states hold that the subrogation right is preserved 
when the injured person tenders the right to the UIM carrier to purchase the 
subrogation right by paying the liability carrier's settlement offer, thus 
paying the injured person the liability settlement and additionally paying out 
the UIM claim. Id. Thereafter, the negligent motorist is subject to personal 
liability for the amount that the UIM carrier has paid to its insured on the 
UIM coverage. 
In judicially creating this right of the UIM earner to pay the liability 
amount, Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256, 260,261 (Minn. 1983) holds 
that there is no obligation of the claimant to exhaust the liability limits. 
Therefore, the preservation of subrogation rights does not necessarily require 
a tender of policy limits. 
While the Utah statute provides a way for the UIM carrier to 
preserve its subrogation rights, the real purpose of this preservation is to 
prevent the UIM carrier from doing what it tried to do in Minnesota and 
New Jersey, that is, avoid paying the UIM claim by confounding an 
injured person with an unsolvable dilemma. Therefore, Utah's 
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subrogation statute ought to be construed to benefit the UIM claimant, not as 
a technical excuse for the UIM carrier to avoid payment. 
Moreover, this subrogation right is of nearly no value to the UIM carrier, 
almost never being actually preserved by following the statutory or judicially 
created procedure because it has no practical value . The reasons are obvious 
and undisputed. 
First, the UIM carrier would have to pay to its insured both the liability 
settlement amount and then its UIM coverage as well. Then the UIM carrier 
would have to sue the negligent motorist to try to recover the sum of those 
two amounts. The liability carrier would then defend that suit. After years of 
litigation and likely spending over a $100,000 in attorney's fees and expert 
witness costs, the UIM carrier would have to go trial to obtain a judgment. 
The UIM carrier would be required to go to trial because the liability carrier 
will not settle for an amount in excess of its policy limits. Yet that excess 
amount is the very UIM payout for which the UIM carrier seeks subrogation. 
Thus, the UIM carrier must incur the expense of paying the liability 
settlement, then incur the substantial expense of litigation to verdict and if it 
Mr. McArthur argued this point below without opposition from State 
Farm. Had discovery been permitted, this would have been one area 
explored. 
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then finally gets a judgment against the tortfeasor, il must seek to collect the 
excess judgment from his or her personal assets, if he or she has not filed 
bankruptcy or transferred them to an asset protection trust. 
In this case, for example, State Farm would be faced with about a 
$100,000 in attorney's fees and costs of litigation for the right to get a 
personal judgment against the at-fault driver for $100,000 in excess of 
liability policy limits which it probably could never collect. Obviously, 
insurance carriers do not engage in such speculative waste of their resources. 
Therefore, the Utah code's reference to policy limits, tied only to the 
subrogation scheme, in a context entirely unrelated to the substantive 
operation of the UIM claim, does not constitute an expression of the public 
policy of Utah on the issue of exhaustion. It certainly is not a sufficiently 
clear statement to overcome the unjust effects and public policy concerns of 
the exhaustion clause that other the majority view has convincingly asserted. 
The context of this reference to "policy limits" implies nothing regarding the 
validity of the exhaustion clause. There is no evidence that this reference to 
policy limits is anything more than a convenient way to express what the 
typical subrogation situation confronting that UIM carrier would look like. 
8
 After the judgment the liability carrier would pay its $100,000 in policy 
limits for a total of $200,000. 
26 
That is because the great majority of UIM claims probably follow exhaustion 
of policy limits even in states where such exhaustion is not required. 
If a court must give strict deference to the language, it could be read to 
require UIM insurance carriers to rely on liability settlement of policy limits 
only if there is a reasonable basis for making a subrogation claim. It could be 
construed to mean that if the Plaintiff obtains a policy limits settlement, then 
it can insist that within five days, the UIM carrier either waive subrogation or 
pay the policy limits. However, if the injured person desires to take less than 
policy limits, he or she loses the right to demand the waiver of subrogation 
within five days. The injured person would have to obtain the consent of the 
UIM carrier to settle for less than policy limits or the plaintiff could still 
recover UIM coverage if he or she can show that the UIM carrier could not 
actually collect a subrogation judgment. Utah law excuses the plaintiff from 
making the five day demand where the UIM carrier cannot actually collect its 
subrogation claim. In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48, 
89 P.3d 97 (Sup. Ct. 2003) the court ruled that the consent to settle clause as 
used by a UIM carrier to avoid payment of UIM benefits was ineffective 
unless the UIM carrier could show that it was prejudiced by the refusal to 
obtain the right of consent, thus, in effect, requiring the UIM carrier to prove 
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that it could have actually collected a subrogation judgment. At page 104 
the court reasoned: 
We agree with Green and join those courts holding that the breach of 
consent to settle exclusion is material only if it results in actual, rather 
than theoretical, impairment of an insurer's ability to recover through 
subrogation. The purpose of UIM coverage is to provide a source of 
indemnification for accident victims when the tortfeasor does not have 
adequate coverage. Denying coverage to an accident victim on the 
basis of a merely technical breach that has no effect on the 
insurer's ability to recover through subrogation does not further 
that purpose. (Emphasis added.) 
This language has direct applicability to the instant case. This Honorable 
Court has held that it would not countenance the denial of UIM benefits by 
operation of a "merely technical breach" such as the acceptance of the 
$90,000 instead of the $100,000 policy limits because such technical breach 
did not affect State Farm's ability to recover through subrogation. 
E. THE WESTERN STATES WHO HAVE REJECTED THE 
EXHAUSTION CLAUSE ON PUBLIC POLICY ALL HAVE 
STATUTORY REFERENCES TO "POLICY LIMITS." 
The essence of State Farm's argument boils down to the proposition 
that Utah statutory law has expressed a public policy in favor of the 
exhaustion clause because of the mere mention of the phrase, "policy limits,' 
in the UIM statute. This therefore begs an analysis of the statutes of the 
states that have followed the majority rule in rejecting the exhaustion clause. 
28 
Mr. Mc Arthur will first concentrate his efforts on the Western jurisdictions 
neighboring Utah. 
1. Definitional Statutes Analyzed 
State Farm first argues that Utah Code Annotated section 31A-22-
305.3 (b)(i), which defines an uninsured motor vehicle, requires exhaustion. 
It provides that an "[u]nderinsured motor vehicle' includes a motor vehicle . . 
. which has insufficient liability coverage . . . ." 
Nevada's counterpart to 31A-22-305.3 (b)(i), found at Nev. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 687B.145, reads as follows: 
Uninsured and underinsured vehicle coverage must include a provision 
which enables the insured to recover up to the limits of his own 
coverage any amount of damages for bodily injury from his insurer 
which he is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of 
the other vehicle to the extent that those damages exceed the limits of 
the coverage for bodily injury carried by that owner or operator. 
[Emphasis added.] 
The Nevada Supreme Court struck down the exhaustion clause, 
notwithstanding explicit reference to policy "limits" in its UIM statute. 
Significantly, the Utah statute defining UIM coverage never refers to policy 
limits but refers to "insufficient liability coverage." Utah's statue is 
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therefore, less compelling than Nevada's for the argument that its statutory 
language demands acceptance of the exhaustion clause. 
Arizona's statutory scheme at A.R.S. § 20-259.01 also defines 
underinsured motorist coverage in terms of liability limits: 
"Underinsured motorist coverage" includes coverage for a person if the 
sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury or death liability 
bonds and liability insurance policies applicable at the time of the 
accident is less than the total damages for bodily injury or death 
resulting from the accident. To the extent that the total damages 
exceed the total applicable liability limits, the underinsured motorist 
coverage provided in subsection B of this section is applicable to the 
difference. 
Addressing the issue of whether this statutory language justified the 
exhaustion clause, Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fonk, 198 Ariz. 167, 170 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2000) held: 
The explanation of UIM coverage in A.R.S. § 20-259.01(G) does not 
provide for exhaustion of a tort-feasor's liability coverage before UIM 
benefits come into play. Rather, it speaks of the "limits of liability" 
under "liability bonds and liability insurance policies applicable at the 
time of the accident. . . . " It provides that UIM coverage is applicable 
"to the extent that the total damages exceed the total applicable 
liability limits. . . . " As stated in the statute, entitlement to UIM 
benefits is based on damages that exceed the applicable liability limits 
rather than being based on payment or exhaustion of those limits; the 
statutory language does not require exhaustion of the applicable 
liability limits as a precondition to payment of UIM benefits. Thus, 
only language in Country Mutual's policy, not language in the statute, 
requires exhaustion of the tort-feasor's liability policy before [*** 11] 
damages that exceed the liability policy limits will be paid under the 
UIM coverage. 
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The Arizona court held that the reference to "limits of liability" only means 
that the UIM carrier is entitled to constructive exhaustion or a credit for the 
total liability limits. This constructive exhaustion concept is discussed in 
more detail below at section F. 
Washington also ruled with the majority in Hamilton v. Farmers Ins, 
Co. of Washington, 107 Wn. 2d 721, 733 P.2d 213 (1987) that the exhaustion 
clause was void as against public policy, although its statute uses "limits of 
liability" in defining an underinsured motorist: 
RCW 48.22.030(2) provides in part: An 
f
'[u]nderinsured motor vehicle1' is defined as a vehicle with insufficient 
insurance to compensate the plaintiffs damages: 
"Underinsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle with respect to 
the ownership, maintenance, or use of which either no bodily injury or 
property damage liability bond or insurance policy applies at the time 
of an accident, or with respect to which the sum of the limits of liability 
under all bodily injury or property damage liability bonds and 
insurance policies applicable to a covered person after an accident is 
less than the applicable damages which the covered person is legally 
entitled to recover. [As quoted in Hamilton v. Farmers, Id. at 216. 
Emphasis in the court's citation.] 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bencomo, 873 P.2d 47, (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1994) held the exhaustion clause void as against the public policy of 
Colorado, even though the Colorado statutes also defined underinsured 
motorists coverage in terms of policy limits: "C.R.S. 10-4-609: "[UIM] . . . 
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coverage . . . shall cover the difference, if any, between the amount of the 
limits of any legal liability coverage and the amount of the damages 
sustained,. . . ." 
Utah's statutory language never employs the phrase "limits of 
liability" in defining an underinsured motorist vehicle. Even its reference to 
"insufficient liability coverage" is found in a non-exclusive definition. 
Utah's statute says that an "underinsured motor vehicle includes" one with 
"insufficient liability coverage." 31A-22-305.3 (b)(i). The word "includes" 
leaves open the possibility that the court could find UIM coverage other than 
in the exact language of Section 31 A-22-305.3(l )(b)(i). Therefore, the Utah 
legislature was careful not to pin down too exactly the definition of a vehicle 
entitled to underinsured motorist coverage, suggesting that the legislature 
desired to define UIM coverage broadly, subject to certain specific 
restrictions, but otherwise leaving open to the courts the option to do justice 
according to the beneficial purposes of the statute. 
If, in the several Western states cited above, the use of the phrase 
"limits of liability" in the definitional sections of their UIM statutes did not 
preclude vitiation of the exhaustion clause, then certainly in Utah the mere 
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reference to policy limits in a tangential section of the UIM code relating to 
subrogation should not have that effect either. 
2. The Statutory Provision for the Consumer to Opt Out of UIM 
Coverage Has no Effect on the Exhaustion Clause in the Western 
States 
State Farm argues that Utah's statutory mandate that each insurance 
carrier offer all motorists UIM coverage is not a strong public policy because 
the consumer can opt out of the coverage. However, that argument once 
again fails to prevail under the majority view. Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 687B.145, Arizona (A.R.S. § 20-259.01), Washington (Rev. Code Wash. 
(ARCW) § 48.22.030), Colorado (C.R.S. 10-4-609) and Montana (Mont. 
Code Anno., § 33-23-201 all allow the motorists to opt out of the mandatory 
offer of UIM coverage. Nevertheless, their courts find the UIM statutes to 
express a strong public policy, inconsistent with the exhaustion clause. 
3. How does Utah's treatment of the UIM carrier's right of 
subrogation compare to other Western states? 
Washington in Hamilton v. Farmers Ins. Co., 107 Wn.2d 721, 733 
(Wash. 1987) adopted the rule of Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256 
(Minn. 1983), superseded by statute as stated in Onasch v. Auto-Owners Ins. 
Co., 444 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), that the UIM carrier could 
preserve a right of subrogation if it paid the liability claim before releasing 
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the tortfeasor. It held that any other application of the right of subrogation 
would undermine the purposes of the UIM statute. Thus, Washington, like 
Minnesota, has effected judicially what Utah has done statutorily: the 
protection of the UIM insured from having his UIM coverage denied under 
the pretext of the violation of subrogation rights. However, Minnesota 
granted the UIM carrier 30 days notice to decide whether to step into the 
shoes of the liability carrier in order to preserve its right of subrogation. 
Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256,263 (Minn. 1983). Utah law is not 
nearly as generous at five days. U.C.A. 31A-22-305.3(5)(a). 
Nevada simply denies the underinsurer the right of subrogation. Nev. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 687B.145. Arizona's statue gives the UIM carrier a two 
year limitations period in which to bring an action for subrogation or 
reimbursement. It does not impose a five-day deadline to pay the liability 
claim or waive its right of subrogation. It is unclear how Arizona has solved 
the subrogation dilemma. Its protection of the insurer's right of subrogation 
is more extensive than Utah's and yet it still adopted the majority rule. 
Montana seems to have no subrogation statute but relies on a case 
similar to Utah's State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 89 P.3d 97, 104, 
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2003 UT 48 (Sup. Ct. 2003) to prevent injustice to the insured. See 
discussion above at pp. 15 and 27. 
Utah's statute seems unique to the West, although Oregon currently 
has a somewhat similar provision. Subsection (D) of Oregon Revised 
Statutes 742.504(d) requires the insured to obtain consent to settle or to 
protect the insured's right of subrogation if the insured obtains a settlement 
less than policy limits.9 Oregon had, under a previous applicable statute, 
9ORS § 742.504 (d): This coverage does not appl)T with respect to 
underinsured motorist benefits unless: 
(A) The limits of liability under any bodily injury liability insurance 
applicable at the time of the accident regarding the injured person have been 
exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements to the injured person or 
other injured persons; 
(B) The described limits have been offered in settlement, the insurer has 
refused consent under paragraph (a) of this subsection and the insured 
protects the insurer's right of subrogation to the claim against the tortfeasor; 
(C) The insured gives credit to the insurer for the unrealized portion of the 
described liability limits as if the full limits had been received if less than the 
described limits have been offered in settlement, and the insurer has 
consented under paragraph (a) of this subsection; or 
(D) The insured gives credit to the insurer for the unrealized portion of the 
described liability limits as if the full limits had been received if less than the 
described limits have been offered in settlement and, if the insurer has 
refused consent under paragraph (a) of this subsection, the insured protects 
the insurer's right of subrogation to the claim against the tortfeasor. 
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adopted the majority view regarding the exhaustion clause. Vega v. Farmers 
Ins. Co. of Oregon, 323 Or. 291, 918 P.2d 95 (1996). 
The one case in the country whose statute mentions "liability 
limits" in the subrogation context rejects the exhaustion clause as against 
public policy. 
Florida has a similar statutory solution to the subrogation dilemma in 
which policy limits are mentioned but it, nevertheless, holds with the 
majority rule in striking down the exhaustion clause. New Hampshire Ins. 
Co. v. Knight, 506 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1987) quotes the statute: 
Section 627.727(6), Florida Statutes provides: 
(6) If an injured person or, in the case of death, the personal 
representative agrees to settle a claim with a liability insurer and its 
insured for the limits of liability, and such settlement would not fully 
satisfy the claim for personal injuries or wrongful death so as to create 
an underinsured motorist claim against the underinsured motorist 
insurer, then such settlement agreement shall be submitted in writing 
to the underinsured motorist insurer, which shall have a period of 30 
days from receipt thereof in which to agree to arbitrate the 
underinsured motorist claim and approve the settlement, waive its 
subrogation rights against the liability insurer and its insured, and 
authorize the execution of a full release. If the underinsured motorist 
insurer does not agree within 30 days to arbitrate the underinsured 
motorist claim and approve the proposed settlement agreement, waive 
its subrogation rights against the liability insurer and its insured, and 
authorize the execution of a full release, the injured person or, in the 
ORS § 742.504 
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case of death, the personal representative may file suit joining the 
liability insurer's insured and the underinsured motorist insurer to 
resolve their respective liabilities for any damages to be awarded; 
however, in such action, the liability insurer's coverage must first be 
exhausted before any award may be entered against the underinsured 
motorist insurer, and any such award against the underinsured motorist 
insurer shall be excess and subject to the provisions of subsection (1). 
Any award in such action against the liability insurer's insured is 
binding and conclusive as to the injured person and underinsured 
motorist insurer's liability for damages up to its coverage limits. 
[Emphasis added] 
Then the court rejected the argument that this language compelled 
acceptance of the exhaustion clause: 
New Hampshire argues that this section explicitly requires that 
the tort-feasor's policy limits be first exhausted before a claim can be 
made for underinsured coverage. This contention has been squarely 
rejected by other courts which have considered it. In Abberton v. 
Colonial Perm Insurance Company, All So.2d 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), 
cert denied, 430 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1983) the court said: 
"The enactment of this section had no effect on section 
627.727(1) which still provides that the coverage is over and above but 
shall not duplicate the benefits available to an insured." [Emphasis in 
original]. 
The Florida courts confronted with a statutory provision similar to that 
of Utah and an argument that such statute validates the exhaustion clause 
expressly rejected the argument, striking down the exhaustion clause, 
reasoning that their statutes should be construed to do justice and not to 
enshrine the exhaustion clause by some technical reference to policy limits, a 
reference found only in the context of subrogation rights. Clearly, the 
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Florida courts construe the legislative language in the subrogation scheme to 
be merely representative of the typical situation and not an endorsement of 
the exhaustion clause. This seems to be the only case directly on this point. 
Notwithstanding the variety of treatments of subrogation, one thing 
remains clear. The statutory and case law treatment of subrogation arise out 
of the need to protect the UIM insured from the ploy of using subrogation to 
deny benefits. It would be against public policy for a statute designed to 
protect the consumer to be used to deny him or her benefits on a technical 
basis. 
State Farm has not born its burden to show that the public policy 
interests expressed in the majority rule are any different in Utah. Rather, Mr. 
McArthur has shown that the same public policy interests expressed as 
justification for the majority's vitiation of the exhaustion clause appear 
prominently in Utah's case and statutory law: avoidance of litigation, 
promotion of settlement and the mandatory and beneficial nature of UIM 
coverage. Utah's statutory scheme falls in line with the statutes of the cases 
that adopted the majority view. 
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F. STATE FARM HAS NO ECONOMIC INTEREST IN THE 
EXHA USTION CLA USE EEC A USE THE UIM CARRIER IS 
GIVEN CREDIT FOR THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF THE 
LIABILITY POLICY LIMITS EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFF HAS 
NOT OBTAINED THOSE LIMITS 
The many jurists who have rejected the exhaustion clause have held 
that the UIM carrier is given credit for the full policy limits. (See for example 
the Nevada and Montana cases cited above.) The majority rule sometimes 
calls this "constructive exhaustion." Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 215 W. 
Va. 297, 306 (W. Va. 2004). 
In explanation of the credit consider this hypothetical. Assume that 
Mr. McArthur's total personal injury recovery at trial is $180,000. State 
Farm would only have to pay $80,000 because it would get a credit for the 
full $100,000 although Mr. McArthur only received $90,000 from the 
liability carrier. Mr. McArthur would have received the $90,000 from the 
liability carrier and $80,000 from his own UIM carrier for a total of 
$170,000, yielding a sacrifice of the $10,000 in liability limits that he 
relinquished to obtain a quick settlement. This arrangement satisfies entirely 
the legitimate interest of the UIM carrier and fulfills the intent of the 
language of the exhaustion clause. The UIM carrier never loses any money if 
there is a credit granted. Moreover, the insured has every incentive to 
maximize his recovery against the liability policy. 
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G. UTAH PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS VITIATION OF THE 
EXHA USTION CLA USE. 
Utah law favors UIM insurance, considering it so important that it 
requires an insurance company to give UIM coverage to every person in the 
state of Utah who drives a motor vehicle. See UCA 31 A-22-305.3(2)(b). 
Subsection (2)(d) provides for minimum limits of UIM coverage. The statute 
also provides that an insured may only avoid UIM coverage by an express 
written form that "includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of the 
underinsured motorist coverage and when it would be applicable." UCA 
31A-22-305.3(2)(g). 
Moreover, Utah's strong public policy to encourage settlement and 
discourage litigation supports vitiation of the exhaustion clause. Iron Head 
Constr., Inc. v. Gurney, 2009 UT 25, P13 (Utah 2009) referred to "Utah's 
clear public policy of encouraging settlements." This public policy has 
remained firm for many years. In 1898 Sandberg v. Victor Gold & Silver 
Mining Co., 18 Utah 66, 73 (Utah 1898) observed: "It is always desirable, 
and in harmony with public policy, that parties to a controversy should be 
permitted to make a bona fide settlement of their difficulties, and courts are 
not inclined to favor a lien which may be used as an instrument to embarrass 
or prevent such settlement.'5 Parents against Drunk Drivers v. Graystone 
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Pines Homeowners1 Ass% 789 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) stated: aIn 
an early case, the Utah Supreme Court held a contractual provision granting 
an attorney control over the settlement of a lawsuit void as against public 
policy. Potter v. Ajax Mining Co., 22 Utah 273, 61 P. 999, 1003 (1900). The 
court found such settlement control provisions run afoul of the policy to 
encourage settlements of causes and differences between persons. 61 P. at 
1003." 
H. STATE FARMMUT AUTO. INS. CO. V. GREEN, 2003 UT48, 
89P.3D 97,104 (SUP. CT. 2003)'S HOLDING SUGGESTS AN 
ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF DECISION. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48, 89 P.3d 97, 104 
(Sup. Ct. 2003) held that UIM benefits should not be avoided where the UIM 
carrier suffers no real prejudice. As shown above, especially as shown by the 
path that Montana took, this holding is consistent with the majority rule that 
rejects the exhaustion clause as against public policy. However, another 
view of its holding suggests that, rather than a rule that vitiates all exhaustion 
clauses, a Green type analysis may be applied on a case-by-case basis. In 
Green, dealing with the consent-to-settle clause, the UIM carrier must prove 
that it suffered prejudice by the claimant's failure to obtain consent-to-settle. 
If the UIM carrier can prove prejudice, then the UIM coverage is avoided, 
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although that proof would be extremely difficult to marshal. So in the 
exhaustion clause case the UIM carrier might be required to prove that it has 
been prejudiced by the settlement of the liability case for less than policy 
limits. The same principles of Green would apply. This would be a variant 
from the majority rule. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Nothing in Utah's statutory scheme militates against adoption of the 
majority rule that holds the exhaustion clause void as against public policy. 
Rather, Utah's statutory scheme is more conducive to the reasoning of the 
majority rule than the statutes of the other Western states that have so ruled. 
Moreover, this Honorable Court's precedent in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48, 89 P.3d 97, 104 (Sup. Ct. 2003) clearly indicates 
that Utah should adopt the majority rule because said case followed the 
majority in preventing UIM carriers from precluding UIM claims on the 
basis of the consent-to-settle clause. 
This Honorable Court should so certify to the Tenth Circuit, that Utah law 
holds that the exhaustion clause is void or, in the alternative, if generally 
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enforceable the UIM carrier must nevertheless prove that it is actually 
prejudiced by the failure of the insured to obtain policy limits. 
Dated this Jio day of February, 2011 
Dixon, Truman, Fisher & Clifford, P.C. 
/s/ A. Bryce Dixon 
A. Bryce Dixon 
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